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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN STANDARD EXAMINER and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ) 
UTAH and LESLIE SKELTON and ) 
T. R. CHENEY, co-conservators ) 
for the dependent children of ) 
CLIFFORD CHENEY, deceased, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18311 
Defendants adopt Plaintiff's statement as to the nature 
of the case, disposition by the Industrial Commission, and 
their relief sought on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deceased was killed in an automobile collision on a 
Utah highway on March 22, 1980, while traveling toward his 
home in Ogden, Utah, after attending the 1980 Governor's 
Ball held at Salt Lake City, Utah. At the time of his death 
he was 38 years old, his wife, who died in the same accident, 
was 35 years old. They were the parents of two minor dependent 
children, ages 8 and 10, for whose benefit this application 
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was filed before the Industrial commission. 
The deceased at the time in question, and for approximately 
nine months prior thereto, had been the managing editor of 
the Ogden Standard Examiner newspaper. 
He and his wife had been invited to attend the Governor's 
Ball by Mrs. Wilda Jean Hatch, president of the Standard 
Corporation, which corporation owns the Ogden Standard 
Examiner (R. 238-239). The Cheneys had driven their own 
automobile to the Hatches' residence in Salt Lake City, and 
after some social cordialities went to the ball with Mr. 
George Hatch, Mrs. Wilda Jean Hatch, and Randall Hatch 
(their son, also an employee of the Ogden Standard Examiner) 
and his wife. After the ball the three couples returned to 
the Hatches' residence, spent another short period and then 
the deceased, with his wife, commenced their fatal journey 
toward Ogden. 
The Governor's Ball is primarily a fund raising event 
(R. 157) and is principally attended by business, labor and 
community leaders, and is generally attended by those people 
in order to further business interests (R. 158, 159, 160, 
164, 170, 172). It is an activity in which business leaders 
particularly attend to "see and be seen" (R. 159, 172). 
Attendance is seldom viewed as a social activity (R. 174). 
Those for whom a table was arranged and tickets supplied 
were exclusively managers of the various businesses owned by 
the Hatches (R. 248). Clifford Cheney, as managing editor 
-2-
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of the Ogden Standard Examiner, had no particular political 
alignment or preferences (R. 178, 194), nor was Cheney 
particularly an outgoing or social type of individual (R. 
177-178). He was nevertheless described as a dedicated 
business and newspaper man (R. 180, 185, 194). Just prior 
to the night in question he had been heavily engaged in 
preparation of an anticipated publication of a certain 
newspaper article which, because of its sensitive matter, 
had recently fallen under criticism of management on a 
higher level than himself (R. 189, 195, 210). The major 
stated purposes for attendance at the ball by the deceased 
was for the purpose of rubbing shoulders with the "big wigs" 
and because management wanted him to (R. 187). The very 
last conversation prior to his leaving for the ball was with 
two reporters for the Ogden Standard Examiner who were 
working with him on the above mentioned article and that he 
was going to the ball in hopes for a chance to encourage 
acceptance by the Hatches of the disputed article (R. 197, 
l99, 200, 201, 203, 204). 
During the week prior to his death, the deceased had 
visiting with him and his wife in their home, Mrs. Cheney's 
sister and her husband, Pam and Steve Skelton from Eugene, 
Oregon {R. 205). Despite the fact that the visit was an 
annual affair and the couple had a close relationship, the deceased 
was unable to spend much time with the visitors because of 
the pressures of work and specifically the completion of the 
-3-
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article in question (R. 198, 200, 201, 202, 210). The night 
of the ball was also the last night of the Skeltons' visit, 
and the deceased told his wife that he would attend the ball 
whether she did or not (R. 212). 
It appeared from the testimony that it was exceedingly 
important for him to attend in order to spend time with the 
Hatches, the owners of the newspaper (R. 217). The deceased 
stated prior to his death that he felt the ball offered an 
opportunity to discuss and clarify with the Hatches newspaper 
policy (R. 217, 228). Prior to attendance at the ball, he 
rented a tuxedo for the occasion, which rental cost he 
considered a business expense (R. 218). He expressed to the 
Skeltons on the night of his death that he needed to discuss 
the paper and policy with the Hatches and get an understanding 
of their philosophies and policies on the content and other 
positions on editorial contents of the paper and publications 
of the article in question (R. 149, 229). 
The general manager of the Ogden Standard Examiner and 
the deceased's immediate supervisor was Mr. Jack Banks (R. 
272, 283). It was he who had taken charge of the affairs of 
the family and funeral arrangements the morning after the 
deaths, and it was he, as he testified, who would be involved 
in insurance claims and the like concerning the paper and 
its employees (R. 235, 272, 283). At the home of the deceased 
the day after the accident, when told by the decedent's 
father that he, the decedent's father, felt the accident 
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arose out of a business trip, Banks replied that he did not 
see a problem with that and "that the paper's insurance 
should cover it" (R. 234). 
The Hatches, who invited the Cheneys to the event, are 
in their 60's. They testified that in their mind the occasion 
was a social event wherein they invited the Cheneys and 
their son and his wife in order that they may get better 
acquainted. 
The invitation extended to the Cheneys was made by Mrs. 
Hatch at the office of the Ogden Standard Examiner. Testimony 
of the Hatches stresses that at the ball and during the 
visits at the Hatch home, business was neither discussed nor 
conducted (R. 246, 261, 276). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT FULLY SUPPORT ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION 
THAT CLIFFORD CHENEY'S DEATH AROSE OUT 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
As early as 1936 in the case of Jones v. Industrial 
Commission, 90 Utah 121, 61 P.2d 10 (1936), as cited by the 
Plaintiffs, this Court held in reviewing an order of the 
Industrial Commission it will examine the findings of fact 
by the Commission in light of the issue of law raised by the 
claim in order to determine whether such an award is supported 
by the findings. 
The Court is to review the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commission's findings {Entwistle Company 
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v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981), and cases cited therein) 
and support the Commission's findings unless clearly arbitrary 
or capricious (Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 
174, 246 P. 698 (1926)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1953) provides that the 
dependents of an employee "who [is] killed by an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment" are 
entitled to workmen's compensation benefits. Whether Clifford 
P. Cheney died as a result of "an accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment ••• " depends on the particular 
circumstance of the case, Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 
P.2d 926 (1980). Although there existed no written job 
description, it may well be agreed that the customary place 
of decedent's employment was the newspaper office. A newsman, 
however, would be well expected to be found on job elsewhere 
and certainly a managing editor would be expected to carry 
on the affairs of his office wherever necessary and opportune. 
Certainly the essential thing is that there be some substantial 
relationship between the activity engaged in and the carrying 
on of the employer's business, Askren v. Industrial Commission, 
15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964). 
As argued by the Plaintiff, in a case where an employee 
whose place and hours at work are fixed, it is usually not 
difficult to ascertain whether an accident arises out of or 
in the course of his employment. The more difficult questions 
are presented when there exists no written job description 
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and where the time and work are flexible, as in this case. 
An employee even away from the customary and regular place 
of employment and duties thereof may nevertheless be covered 
by workmen's compensation insurance. Those situations arise 
when an employee is upon the special mission of the employer 
and the generally accepted rule remains that: 
That an injury sustained by an employee, 
either on his employer's or his own time, 
arises out of his employment if the 
employee is injured while on a mission 
for his employer. 
Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 46, 207 P.2d 1116 
(1949). This Court has adopted the concept that what is and 
what is not a special mission for the employer may depend 
upon the characterization of the employee's duties and those 
obligations which naturally flow from its work. In the case 
of Hafers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 526 P.2d 1188 
(1974), this Court stated: 
The scope of one's employment includes 
not only those things which are direct 
and primary duties of the assigned 
job; but also those things which are 
reasonably necessary and incidental 
thereof. 
The Plaintiff in its brief cited extensively from 
Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise, Workmen's Compensation 
Law, hereinafter referred to as "Larson." Larson is recognized 
as the leading authority in this field and the Defendant 
takes no exception to the references cited therein by Plaintiff, 
except that as to their interpretation of paragraph 3 of 
Larson's statement in Volume lA, § 22, page 5, Point 41. 
-7-
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The employer need not derive some substantial benefit directly 
from the activity but the intent must be that some benefit 
be derived. It is certainly feasible that in any employment 
situation an employee could be sent on an errand, the result 
of which would be futile, but the benefit nevertheless was 
intended and therefore the activity would be considered 
within the scope of the employment. Such a test has been 
adopted by the Utah Court in the case of Martinson v. W. M. 
Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256 {1980). Although the decision 
in that case held against the applicant on a combined business 
and social function, the facts can easily be distinguished 
from this case. The law, however, lies in favor of this 
applicant. This Court, after discussion of the applicable 
law {and with which this applicant has no quarrel) concluded 
that the main reason for the trip to Park City in that case 
was for pleasure and that the applicant did not go to Park 
City for the primary purpose of conducting business, nor was 
there anything to be done at Park City that could not be 
done over the telephone and without leaving his office in 
Salt Lake City, and essentially that the applicant went 
~ 
there only because he wanted to and not necessarily to 
further the interests of the employer. That case is substantially 
different from this one on the facts and it is certainly 
understandable why this Court held as it did. 
In this case, however, Cheney's primary motivation in 
attending the ball was far from social. The argument on 
-8-
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pages 10 and 11 of the Plaintiff's brief relative to social 
activities, parties, games, etc. as discussed in Larson have 
very little, if any applicability in this case, nor has this 
Court expressly adopted Larson "test" of compensability of 
accidents which arise out of social events. 
The Plaintiff further cites the cases of Prouse v. 
Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (1980), and Lundberg v. 
Cream 0 Weber Dairy Farms, 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175 
(1970), neither of which cases hold any relationship to the 
case at issue. In the first case the Court denied the same 
on the basis that workmen's compensation coverage only 
provides coverage for those activities in which an employee 
is reasonably required to engage in the performance of his 
duties and which directly and intangibly benefit his employer. 
In that case, of course, horseplay did not. In the latter 
case, the Court specifically found that the deceased was in 
travel to and from work and, of course, this Court, and 
many others, has held that such an activity does not in and 
of itself qualify. The specific exception to that rule, 
however, is where the employee is engaged in a special mission 
or activity. Cudahay Packing Company v. Industrial Commission, 
60 Utah 161, 207 P.2d 148 (1922). 
The Plaintiffs also cite the case of Wilson v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, in contending that the law therein applies 
to this case. We readily agree. The facts, of course, in 
that case are substantially different; nevertheless, the 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
principle of law is still applicable and accepted by the 
Defendant. 
This is not a case raising issues of law. It is a case 
of facts. The law is well established that there is a 
special omission exception to the travel to and from work, 
and this Court is simply called upon to determine whether 
there is a substantial relationship between the activity 
engaged in, i.e., the special errand or mission and the 
carrying on the employer's business. 
This case, however, turns on one additional and extremely 
important fact, and that is that the deceased was in a 
managerial position and as such made his own decisions as to 
what he should do and what he should not do in furtherance 
of the employer's business, and he had fully in mind the 
intention of furthering said employer's business in using 
the Governor's Ball for such an opportunity. 
In this regard, it should be understood at the outset 
that the Defendants have no argument with the established 
law in the State of Utah, and their position is simply that 
the facts of this case fall well within the established law, 
and as determined by the Industrial Commission, is fully 
compensable. 
In this analysis, it is instructive to review the 
function and purpose of the Governor's Ball, the factors 
relating to the deceased's attendance thereto, and the 
purpose for the same. 
-10-
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The tickets were purchased by the Hatches and held 
only by managers of the Hatches' businesses. The two persons 
invited to attend were the managing editor and the promotion 
director of the Ogden Standard Examiner. The difference in 
ages between the Hatches and the Cheneys was almost 30 
years (Tr. 122.17-123.60), the invitation thereto was made 
on the job by an officer of the Ogden Standard Examiner. 
Two entirely unattached and presumably entirely unbiased 
witnesses, Maggie Wilde, the Governor's former press secretary, 
and Kent Briggs, the executive assistant to the Governor, 
are probably as highly qualified persons as can be found to 
testify relative to the Governor's Ball and those who generally 
attend. Each testified that business people attend to 
further business interests, that the ball is generally a 
fund-raising event attended by business, labor and community 
leaders where they can see and be seen and who go there to 
have doors opened to them in the business world and for 
their business interests. The apparent major reasons that 
people have for attending the Governor's Ball are political 
and business. But it should be remembered that Cheney is 
described as having no political alignment and was essentially 
apolitical. It can be safely concluded that he did not 
attend for political reasons. The fact that the tickets 
were held and a table reserved only for managers of the 
Hatches' companies is even more significant, and is the 
plethora of testimony as to the deceased's uttered intentions 
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for attending the ball. 
It is undisputed that the deceased intended on attending 
the Governor's Ball that night specifically for the purpose 
of rubbing elbows with the big wigs and because management 
wanted him to {Tr. 39:5-12). Even more importantly, the 
event was an opportunity for him to discuss with the owners 
of the paper management policies relating specifically to 
the article in question. Even his very last conversation 
with the two reporters who were working with him on the 
article was that he was going to the ball in hopes for a 
chance to encourage acceptance by the Hatches of his disputed 
article. So important did this seem that he denied himself, 
with or without his wife, the opportunity of further visiting 
with family friends in order to attend the ball. 
It is difficult to construe that such a decision would 
turn only on social reasons. It was stated emphatically 
that it was extremely important for him to go and spend time 
with the Hatches, the owners of the paper. Cheney felt the 
ball offered the opportunity to discuss and clarify policy. 
Even the tuxedo rental was considered by him as a business 
expense. He was unequivocal the night before his death in 
stating that he needed to discuss the paper with the Hatches 
to gain an understanding of their philosophies and policies 
on content and other positions of editorial matters of the 
paper, and that the ball would present that opportunity. 
Even Jack Banks, the general manager of the Ogden Standard 
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Examiner, apparently considered the Cheneys' attendance at 
the ball to be business related. Such, of course, would not 
be the case had he considered it only to be a social event. 
It is clear that in the mind of the employee that he as 
manager would attend the Governor's Ball in order to further 
the interests of his employer by discussing the publication 
of the article and gaining an understanding as to their 
editorial policies. An analysis of the facts of this case 
can lead to no other conclusion but that the deceased intended 
on accepting the invitation to the Governor's Ball by his 
employer for reasons directly related to the interests of 
that employer and to the benefit of the newspaper. For the 
Plaintiffs to argue that the same was only a social event 
and therefore not compensable ignores really all essential facts 
in question. 
There can only be one conclusion drawn from the Commission's 
findings and the evidence presented, and that is that Clifford 
Cheney considered attendance at that event to be within the 
course of his employment, necessary for his employment, and 
an intrical part thereof, and that the employer's business 
would be conducted and furthered by attendance thereat. 
Plaintiffs seem to rely heavily on the point that no conversation 
occurred relative to business purposes. It should be noted, 
however, that whether any were engaged in is not the test. 
The test is rather whether the employee was there with the 
intention and capability of conducting business of the 
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employer. There can be no other conclusion drawn than that 
is the exact reason he was there and the only reason he 
attended. 
II 
THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 
DECEASED'S DEATH AROSE OUT OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The Plaintiff raises in its Point II of argument that 
the deceased attended the Governor's Ball at the request of 
the Hatches and that such a request was social in nature. 
Despite the fact the Hatches testified that in their mind 
this was no more than a social invitation and this is hardly 
the only inquiry which need be made in this case. The 
Plaintiff appears mesmerized over the apparent three prong 
test of Professor Larson in that this was a social event, 
though not sponsored by the Ogden Standard Examiner, that 
Cheney's attendance was not specifically required, and the 
tickets were not purchased or paid for by the employer, nor 
that any claim was made that it was an employee benefit to 
which Mr. Cheney was entitled. None of these factors are 
important in a question to be decided. 
What is important are the reasons that Cheney attended. 
It must be noted from the outset that the event in question 
was not a social arrangement, as the Defendant would have 
the Court believe. The tickets were not purchased by social 
friends, but by the heads of the Hatches' several businesses. 
And although Mrs. Hatch did testify that she had no business 
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purpose in mind in inviting the deceased to the ball, it is 
apparent that other considerations were in the mind of the 
deceased when he accepted the invitation. The tone of 
interchange as argued by the Plaintiff between Cheney and 
Mrs. Hatch is not determinative as to the purpose for his 
attending. Nor the fact that he needed to check with his 
wife, as he told his wife that he would attend whether she 
did or not. With respect to supervisory personnel and any 
conduct on their part making it mandatory for Cheney to 
attend, it must be remembered that he in fact was supervisory 
personnel, that he determined when and where he should go 
for the benefit of the paper. Nor does the fact that Cheney 
had any public relations responsibilities make any difference 
in this case. It has been the applicant's position all 
along that he did not attend for public relations nor as a 
social event, but in order to discuss a pertinent article 
and publication thereof, together with editorial policy, 
with the Hatches. It is helpful, however, to note that the 
Hatches presented Mr. Cheney to dignataries such as Congressman 
Gunn McKay and Mayor Steve Dirks (R. 262, 280). The Hatches 
and Cheneys, because of the substantial difference in age, 
were not particularly social friends (R. 254, 269) nor was 
there any testimony that was the case, and no other viable 
explanation by the Hatches given for the invitation to be 
extended that night except that it was a result and in 
connection with and for business purposes. 
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It should also be remembered in reviewina Professor 
_, 
Larson's "test" that an invitation from a boss can certainly 
take the aura of a command to attend, coupled with other 
factors. The other factors in this case are the editorial 
policy and pressure for publication of a sensitive article. 
It would appear that the Plaintiff's argument really 
falls on the basis that blue collar workers are compensated 
for injuries suffered on the job simply because their job 
description and location for work is generally easily 
defined, and that managerial employees are denied workmen's 
compensation benefits because their work and their activities 
may be expanded to more than certain hours at certain places. 
Though Clifford Cheney was not self-employed, he was nevertheless 
in a managerial position where he made decisions for the 
benefit of the newspaper and specifically respecting editorial 
policy and publication. In this case, his stated and unequivocal 
intent was to attend that ball for the very purpose of 
discussing that editorial policy and publication with his 
supervisor. 
Does the Plaintiff concede that if in fact he were to 
take a special trip for his employer away from the Ogden 
Standard Examiner off ice in order to conduct that discussion, 
and if in fact the discussion did not take place once he 
arrived, and he was killed on the way home, that he would 
not be compensated? Certainly the fact that the discussion 
was to occur at a social event such as the Governor's Ball 
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does not deny compensation to the two children of the deceased. 
It is argued by the Plaintiff that Jack Banks, the 
deceased's immediate supervisor, had direction and control 
over the activities of the deceased and that since he did 
not specifically tell the deceased that he should go to the 
ball, therefore it is not covered. On the contrary, it was 
Mr. Banks himself who admitted the day after the accident 
that in fact Mr. Cheney's activities were covered and that 
the paper's insurance should provide compensation. To argue 
that the Industrial Commission has misconstrued the law in 
this case is missing the point of this entire appeal. The 
appeal is one based on facts, whether the facts in this case 
fall within the principle of law enunciated by this Court. 
Plaintiff further argues that such an affirmation of 
the Industrial Commission's award would have an onerous 
effect upon workmen's compensation law in this state. It 
should consider the onerous effect such a denial would have 
upon the children of the deceased. Their father was engaged 
in work attending the event for the purpose of discussing 
and furthering the interests of the employer and was killed, 
together with his wife, while engaged in such activity. 
Plaintiff's argument that if this case becomes law it would 
create a strikingly difficult standard of compensability is 
far from the mark. The standard has already been established 
that the activity must be within the scope of or arising out 
of his employment. The facts of this case show specifically 
that in fact it was. For the Plaintiff to argue that this Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic s 
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case falls within such imaginable cases as refreshment 
breaks of co-workers, golf matches and lunch excursions is 
not only grossly unfair, it ignores the facts and is in poor 
taste. Not only is the argument inapplicable and unfinished, 
but certainly there are cases and circumstances where those 
kinds of events would be activities in which injuries would 
be compensable. The only conclusion that can be drawn from 
this case is that when going back to the original definition 
of a compensable injury being one that arose out of or in 
the course of his employment, Mr. Cheney was certainly 
engaged in his employment and was attending that event 
specifically for the purpose of discussing the newspaper 
publication and editorial policy with his immediate supervisors, 
and there is no other evidence but that those are the reasons 
he attended. 
The Plaintiff freely speculates that Clifford Cheney 
attended for social reasons only, when there is absolutely 
no evidence that he did. The Plaintiff produced absolutely 
no evidence to show that the deceased's intended attendance 
thereat was anything but for business and no evidence was 
produced to show that any motivation he had whatsoever was 
for social purposes. 
III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AWARD IS 
BASED ON COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE. 
The Plaintiff argues in Point III that the decision by 
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the Industrial Commission was based entirely upon hearsay 
evidence and therefore apparently incompetent evidence. 
This Court has long held that hearsay evidence is 
admissible, material and competent, Columbia Steel v. 
Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937); 
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 
P.2d 376 (1942), and it is certainly agreed that the Court 
has further held that a finding cannot be based solely on 
hearsay evidence but must be supported by a residum of legal 
evidence competent in a court of law. Sandy State Bank 
v. W. s. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481 (Utah 1981). Though it is 
true that the administrative law judge received extensive 
evidence from two reporters who worked with Cheney and were 
with him just hours before his death and also that of the 
deceased's brother-in-law and sister-in-law, who were also 
with him the week prior to and just hours prior to his 
death, such evidence, although persuasive, substantial and 
competent, was not the only evidence upon which the Commission 
based its award. The argument made by the Plaintiff that 
statements as to the deceased's state of mind are inadmissible 
do not square with the specific provision of this Court 
allowing hearsay evidence nor does it follow Rule 63(12) 
Utah Rules of Evidence. State of mind is specifically an 
issue in this case. 
The rule specifically allows hearsay evidence to the 
declarant's ''intent, plan, motive, design •••• " The intent 
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is exactly what we are here concerned with. The case of 
State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), is inapplicable 
to the issues herein. 
The second argument by Plaintiff that the evidence 
admitted was incompetent is that the opinion as evidenced by 
an apparent lack of understanding the relevance of the testimony 
of Briggs and Wilde, was apparently not the testimony of 
experts. It is difficult to conceive of two individuals 
who would be more expert in the fields in which they were 
called to testify than these two individuals. Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provides for testimony 
from these type of individuals. With respect to the qualifications 
thereof, the Court refers specifically to Transcript, pages 
9 through 24. The Plaintiff's quotation of Mr. Brigg's 
testimony is not only incomplete but entirely unfair as it 
does not take into account his complete testimony as foundational 
testimony for his expertise and it completely ignores that 
of Mrs. Wilde. 
The Plaintiff's argument that no theory was advanced by 
the Defendant as to the relevance of the testimony of Briggs 
and Wilde seems to miss the entire point, as the Plaintiff 
has done throughout this case. The point is, from the 
testimony received that this event was not a social event 
but was a business event and that very few people attend it 
for social purposes but mostly for business and political 
purposes. The Plaintiffs have argued that the Hatches 
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attended for social purposes only, which may be the case 
with them, but was certainly a very unusual situation and 
cannot be patently applied to the deceased. It is necessary 
in this case for the Court to review the entire transcript 
of this matter in order to become familiar with all the 
facts in question. The Plaintiff's quotations from the 
transcript here and there hardly informs the Court as to all 
the facts pertinent herein. This case has a bulwark of non-
hearsay, not just a residum, upon which the award can be 
founded. Specifically, Cheney was employed by the Defendant 
several months prior to and was so employed on the day of 
his death; that his was a position of manager for which the 
employer had no written or detailed job description; that 
the Governor's Ball to which he was to attend and generally 
attended not so much for social reasons but for political 
and business purposes; that Cliff Cheney was essentially a 
non-socialite and both personally and professionally apolitical; 
that he had been at the time of the ball working strenuously 
to complete and gain approval for publication of a controversia: 
article; that his employer had rejected as too sensitive the 
article for publication; that others at the paper had hoped 
that he would use the time at the ball with the Hatches to 
gain approval for publication; that it is for the above 
purpose that they (co-workers and reporters) thought he was 
attending the ball; that he and his wife had company staying 
at their home, yet chose to attend the Ball despite the fact 
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that it was their last night together; that Cliff Cheney 
appeared to be agitated and concerned about the publication 
of the article and the meeting with the Hatches; that he had 
rented a tuxedo for the ball, the cost of which appeared to 
be a concern to his wife, which concern was apparently laid 
to rest with the comment by the deceased about it being a 
business expense; that the Hatches were at least 30 years 
the Cheneys' senior and not social friends; that the tickets 
to the Ball were supplied to or from the heads of the Hatch 
business organization only; that the invitation was made at 
the business office; that upon discussing the problem after 
the accident, the Defendant's general manager, Banks, admitted 
that the matter was work connected and the business insurance 
would take care of it. 
The above facts standing alone would be sufficient to 
sustain an order of the administrative law judge, but the 
findings become overwhelmingly conclusive when supported by 
other competent and admissible evidence. That Cheney thought 
he had been invited for business purposes; that he needed to 
go to discuss editorial policy with the owner of the paper 
and to achieve approval for publication of a controversial 
article; that he felt is so necessary to attend that he 
would go with or without his wife; that he would go even 
though it meant the last evening that they had with their 
in-laws; that he considered the rental of a tuxedo a business 
expense; that for two days prior to and up to the very last 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discussion he had with his co-employees and reporters, that 
it was his and their concern that he attend the ball to sell 
the Hatches on the article; that he was going because the 
owners wanted him to go; he intended to use the opportunity 
for the Defendant newspaper business. 
Against all the above stated facts, the Plaintiffs can 
site only two; that the Hatches intended the invitation to 
be a social event, and that during the course of the evening 
the article and newspaper business were not discussed. 
The law of this jurisdiction is that whether an employee 
is within the scope of his employment depends upon all the 
facts of a particular case. The three prong rule referred 
to as Larson's Rule is not his rule at all, and a careful 
reading of the text thereof as cited in the Defendant's 
brief aptly demonstrates the fallacy and lack of depth of 
Plaintiff's position. That in fact the deceased did attend 
the ball with the intent of performing a service for his 
employer. There can be no other conclusion rendered by the 
facts of this case but that the deceased was attending that 
ball with one purpose in mind, and that was for the benefit 
of his employers, that he was within the scope of his employment, 
that the accident arose out of his employment and is compensable. 
CONCLUSION 
The presumption must lie in favor of the findings made 
by the Commission. This Court has reiterated the principle 
numerous times that: 
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••. in reviewing a record every 
legitimate inference which can arise 
from the evidence must be drawn in 
favor of the employee where the 
Commission has made findings and 
award in his favor. 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 
220, 284 P. 313 (1929). See also Entwistle Company v. Wilkins, 
supra, and cases cited therein. 
Taken in total, factors giving rise to the attendance 
at the Governor's Ball, can lead this Court only to reasonably 
conclude from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
decedent, Clifford P. Cheney, considered it his duty to 
attend the evening's activities. That he did so with the 
intent in mind of furthering the employer's business interest 
and that his attendance clearly resulted in an accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, 
the decision of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
Dated this C:~ay of August, 1982. 
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendants 
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